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Measuring rates and causes of mortalities is important in animal ecology and management. Observing the fates 
of known individuals is a common method of estimating life history variables, including mortality patterns. It has 
long been assumed that data lost when known animals disappear were unbiased. We test and reject this assumption 
under conditions common to most, if not all, studies using marked animals. We illustrate the bias for 4 endangered 
wolf populations in the United States by reanalyzing data and assumptions about the known and unknown fates of 
marked wolves to calculate the degree to which risks of different causes of death were mismeasured. We find that, 
when using traditional methods, the relative risk of mortality from legal killing measured as a proportion of all 
known fates was overestimated by 0.05–0.16 and the relative risk of poaching was underestimated by 0.17–0.44. 
We show that published government estimates are affected by these biases and, importantly, are underestimating the 
risk of poaching. The underestimates have obscured the magnitude of poaching as the major threat to endangered 
wolf populations. We offer methods to correct estimates of mortality risk for marked animals of any taxon and 
describe the conditions under which traditional methods produce more or less bias. We also show how correcting 
past and future estimates of mortality parameters can address uncertainty about wildlife populations and increase 
the predictability and sustainability of wildlife management interventions.
Key words:  carnivore, endangered species, illegal, lethal control, mark–recapture, regulated take
An accurate understanding of causes of death in animal popu-
lations is important for effective management and legitimate 
policy. Contemporary study of wild animal populations has 
benefited enormously from mark–recapture methods to esti-
mate life history variables, such as mortality. However, marked 
animals in such studies sometimes elude recapture, which leads 
to loss of data (i.e., unknown fates). When the proportion of 
unknown fates among marked animals is low, the potentially 
biasing effects of data loss might be correspondingly low. Also, 
when the mortality risks for unknown fates are very similar 
to those for known fates, the loss of data should not bias the 
estimates of life history traits (i.e., this would be “uninforma-
tive censoring”). The traditional presumptions in most studies 
are that marked animals disappear because they moved out of 
range of telemetry or the transmitter technology affixed to the 
animal failed, but otherwise researchers assume the life and 
death of those animals proceeded as it would otherwise have 
done. We examine this assumption for wolves (Canis lupus and 
C. rufus) in the United States, and emerge with a generalizable 
insight broadly applicable to many taxa.
Although early research on grizzly bears (Ursus arctos) 
suggested data loss was biased when humans destroyed radio-
transmitters (McLellan et al. 1999), this idea was not quanti-
fied for gray wolves (C. lupus) until study of the mortality and 
poaching of Scandinavian wolves (Liberg et al. 2012). When 
Adams et al. (2008) documented that 74% of human-caused 
deaths went unreported in an Alaskan gray wolf population, 
even that high rate of loss of data on wolves did not raise 
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concerns, perhaps because unreported killing seemed incon-
sequential to a large, resilient wolf population. Later, parallel 
analyses of Northern Rocky Mountain (NRM) gray wolves 
appeared to accept the assumption of uninformative censoring 
(Murray et al. 2010). They cited unpublished analyses showing 
that including dead radiocollared wolves for which cause of 
death could not be inferred did not produce “qualitatively dif-
ferent results” (Murray et al. 2010:2517). Those unpublished 
analyses of recovered marked wolves whose cause of death was 
unknown are not peer-reviewed as of the time of writing. That 
same year, some of the same authors published another mor-
tality analysis (Smith et al. 2010), in which they inferred that 
some marked wolves of unknown fates dispersed and eluded 
telemetry, because the proportion of suspected dispersers that 
disappeared (31.4%) differed from the proportion (18.1%) of 
known residents that disappeared. High-altitude aerial telem-
etry conducted intensively across the recovery areas was ori-
ented to locating dispersers because of the importance of such 
events (Bangs and Fritts 1996). Smith et al. (2010) analyzed the 
last known locations prior to disappearances to infer that mod-
estly informative censoring was present and the locations of 
disappearance were not in areas of high human activity, there-
fore “associated principally with dispersal status rather than 
human-caused mortality” (Smith et al. 2010:632). That infer-
ence hinges on the hypothesis that levels of poaching would be 
higher in areas of higher human activity. However, we suggest 
that strict protection of wolves might alternatively have made 
people reluctant to kill a wolf where the likelihood of witnesses 
seemed higher. If so, locations more prone to poaching might 
instead include more remote areas. Remote hunting zones might 
reasonably be implicated given that recent research on inclina-
tion to poach indeed implicates hunters in both the NRM and 
in the state of Wisconsin (Treves and Martin 2011; Treves et al. 
2013; Treves et al. 2017a). After Liberg et al. (2012), attention 
to poaching grew in the wolf research community.
Studying Scandinavian gray wolves, researchers estimated 
the major cause of death was poaching, which accounted for 
51% of all mortality (poaching risk). An estimated 66% of that 
poaching went unreported (Liberg et al. 2012). Because the 
study reconstructed the fates of poached wolves that went miss-
ing, it drew attention to—and undermined—the previously held 
assumptions that a small proportion of marked animals disap-
peared and that data loss was minimal. It also raised questions 
about the assumption that unknown fates resembled known 
fates in mortality risk and rate (i.e., censoring was informa-
tive in the Scandinavian study). Further evidence of a problem 
with the latter assumption followed reanalysis of data from 
Adams et al. (2008), working in the Brooks Range of Central 
Alaska. Schmidt et al. (2015) reported at least 15% higher mor-
tality among unmarked gray wolves compared to their marked 
pack-mates. In contrast, another Alaskan study around Denali 
National Park and Preserve reported that marked wolves suffered 
higher rates of regulated killing (Borg et al. 2016). These study 
sites in Alaska, however, differed. The former had few roads, 
and few people, whereas the latter had more of both suggesting 
that the relative risk from humans for marked and unmarked 
animals might be influenced by whether humans can detect col-
lars and are killing wolves legally. A study in Wisconsin, across 
a landscape with denser human activity including many roads, 
people, livestock, hunters, hounds, etc., produced an estimated 
28% higher mortality rate for unmarked gray wolves than for 
marked wolves when illegal killing comprised almost half of all 
deaths (Treves et al. 2017b). Despite current uncertainty about 
why marked or unmarked wolves face different rates of mortal-
ity from humans in different systems, all these studies converge 
to suggest that the traditional assumption is unsupported: fates 
of marked wolves do not seem to accurately represent the risk 
and rates of mortality for the broader population.
Based on the above, we test whether unknown fates of 
marked wolves cause important losses of information that 
would bias results. We also test the specific hypothesis that 
poaching is systematically underestimated when data from 
wolves of unknown fates are omitted. We reanalyzed data 
from 4 populations of wolves in the United States (2 popula-
tions of gray wolves, C. lupus; 1 population of Mexican gray 
wolves, C. l. baileyi; and 1 population of red wolves, C. rufus). 
Although our results are specific to wolves, we identify a gen-
eral mechanism that applies to studies of other species whose 
mortality can be divided into deaths where the cause is known 
and deaths where the cause is unknown.
Materials and Methods
We define legal killing to include regulated harvest or govern-
ment removal of a protected animal, as long as the death was 
reported after a permitted activity. We define poaching as any 
non-permitted killing in which the actor intended to kill an 
animal (trapping, poison, shooting, etc.), as opposed to most 
vehicle collisions in which the driver likely does not intend to 
kill any animal. This definition of poaching is justified under 
the Endangered Species Act because the U.S. Congress of 
1973 explicitly made it illegal to kill a listed species regard-
less of “knowingly” doing so (Newcomer et al. 2011). Also, 
we redefine “known fates” and “unknown fates” from their 
common usage for marked animals. We define known fate as 
any marked animal whose cause of death is confirmed (i.e., 
excluding marked animals whose remains are recovered but are 
assigned to “unknown cause” of death, and excluding marked 
animals that disappear). Importantly, we differ from several 
other authorities by highlighting that “unknown cause” of death 
never includes legal killing (because, by definition, a legal kill 
must be reported so its cause is known). Finally, many stud-
ies of marked animals have to contend with the possibility that 
a marked animal that disappeared is still alive but has eluded 
monitoring. We avoid this difficulty for all 4 populations under 
analysis by restricting ourselves to older time periods, so radio-
collared wolves could not still be alive today.
Section 1: calculating the bias in mortality estimates.—We 
begin with the mathematics underlying estimation of risk of 
mortality, defined as the proportion of all deaths attributable 
to a given cause. The traditional assumption was that data lost 
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animals with known fates ostensibly represented all marked 
animals’ fates. This assumed the relative risks of different 
causes of death were approximately equivalent in marked ani-
mals of known and unknown fates. However, marked animals 
of unknown fate never die from perfectly documented causes, 
such as legal killing, or they would not have disappeared. 
Therefore, the animals of known fate cannot represent the ani-
mals of unknown fate accurately (Fig. 1A).
The mismatch between animals of known fate and those of 
unknown fate introduces error that is not random but systematic 
(biasing). The error is always in the direction of underestimat-
ing the risk posed by inaccurately documented causes of death 
because these sometimes lead to unknown fates. Conversely, 
overestimation of risks of the perfectly documented causes of 
death (e.g., legal killing in our context) occurs because these 
causes are not represented among the unknown fates at all. 
Therefore, the traditional assumption that marked animals of 
known fate represent fates of all marked animals is inaccurate 
as a mathematical fact. The only question that remains is how 
large the inaccuracy might be. We use the method in Table 1A 
to estimate how much the risk of legal killing has been over-
estimated in its proportional contribution to total mortality in 
endangered wolves.
As legal killing increases, the bias caused by discarding 
information on unknown fates increases (Fig. 1B). As the num-
ber of unknown fates (m) increases, so too does the bias. The 
bias increases proportionally to both legal kills and m because 
each additional individual of unknown fate results in increased 
underestimation of inaccurately documented causes, whereas 
each additional legal kill results in increased overestimation 
of the contribution of legal kills. By accounting fully for all 
marked animals (n + m) and by estimating the unknown vari-
ables (Figs. 2A and 2B; Table 1B), we extract more information 
from the sample of marked animals than done traditionally. The 
arithmetic described in Table 1A and Fig. 1 is a mathemati-
cal fact. But we can extract yet more information from well-
documented cases if we split the causes of death as in Table 1B 
and consider the role of P, which estimates cryptic poaching. 
Fig. 1.—Systematic bias in calculating the risk of mortality from legal killing when some marked animals have unknown fates (unobservable with 
question marks ?) and causes of death vary in the accuracy of documentation. The green squares represent legal kills (perfectly documented) and 
the blue squares denote other causes of death (inaccurately documented). Observed (silhouette with binoculars) known fates (check marks ✓, and 
calculation in red text) alone would overestimate the real risk of legal killing. A) Positive bias in estimating risk of legal killing is 0.16. B) Positive 
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Our approach is more efficient because additional information 
is acquired from the sample of marked individuals.
Section 2: estimating unknown fates.—A failure to docu-
ment death of a marked animal can occur because poach-
ers concealed evidence or because the marked animal eluded 
monitoring prior to death (Supplementary Data SD1). Eluding 
monitoring prior to death means a marked animal lived for a 
time and then died undocumented—at least undocumented by 
the same method used on marked animals of known fate. It 
might be reasonable to assume such marked animals are rep-
resented well by the known fates, because eluding monitoring 
does not necessarily imply systematic change in risk. However, 
if poachers destroy evidence before or soon after killing a 
marked animal, then the situation changes entirely. We refer to 
these occasions as “cryptic poaching.” Destruction of evidence 
is rarely, if ever, associated with nonhuman causes of death. We 
examine the many factors that may lead to an unknown fate in 
Supplementary Data SD1, but in the section below, we focus 
on cryptic poaching. We treat cryptic poaching as an event with 
estimable frequency. Attempting to estimate the causes of death 
of the unknown fates can be important if poachers commonly 
destroy evidence or poaching is common. Therefore, we pres-
ent approaches to confront that challenge in estimation.
First, we consider and reject 2 extreme approaches to esti-
mating the expected values in Table 1B and P for cryptic poach-
ing. By rejecting the extreme approaches, we clarify the more 
credible intervals around the values of interest. One extreme 
approach inspired by cryptic poaching might be to apportion all 
the unknown fates to other human causes in Table 1B and none 
to nonhuman causes, assuming that unknown fates only arise 
from a human destroying evidence. That approach certainly 
exaggerates poaching, because technology failure, and marked 
animals that elude monitoring but later die of nonhuman causes, 
can lead to some disappearances (Supplementary Data SD1). 
Likewise, the alternative extreme would apportion all unknown 
fates to nonhuman causes and none to other human causes. 
That assumption requires more evidence to reject, which we 
present in Supplementary Data SD1. Nevertheless, the extreme 
(no cryptic poaching) is illogical by our definition of an animal 
that eludes monitoring. That some marked animals live and die 
unmonitored is likely, but eluding monitoring does not immu-
nize animals from poaching unless all poachers avoid marked 
animals. That seems infeasible if traps, poison, or shooting 
under conditions of low visibility occur. Therefore, the second 
extreme approach is also unrealistic. We assume cryptic poach-
ing occurs and we present 2 reasonable approaches to estimate 
the expected values in Table 1B.
One reasonable approach to estimate cryptic poaching would 
be to estimate Expectednon (the number of marked animals of 
unknown fate expected to die from nonhuman causes) and 
Expectedoh + P (the number of marked animals of unknown 
fate expected to die from other human causes) by their rela-
tive proportions in the known fates, but importantly, exclud-
ing legal kills from that calculation. This “equal apportionment 
approach” perpetuates the assumption that known fates can be 
extrapolated to unknown fates without further correction than 
performed in Table 1A. Equal apportionment is appropriate to 
situations in which 3 criteria are met: 1) marked animals were 
selected randomly from the population as a whole, 2) marked 
animals disappear without regard to the cause of death, and 
3) the researchers have evidence that marking and monitoring 
do not affect risk of different causes of death. We predict these 
conditions will never be met for controversial wildlife, such as 
wolves, but we provide the approach for other species and for 
Bayesian modelers who wish to define informative credible 
intervals. Figure 2A depicts the equal apportionment approach.
If cryptic poaching is non-zero, then poached animals should 
be deducted from m before equal apportionment occurs, because 
poachers interrupted monitoring. Cryptic poaching alters esti-
mates of mortality risk because data are lost; more so as conceal-
ment behavior spreads or becomes more effective. We have 2 
published estimates of cryptic poaching rates to draw upon. For 
Scandinavian wolves, the cryptic poaching rate was estimated 
at 66% of total poaching, suggesting that for each observed 
poached wolf, 2 poached wolves eluded observation (Liberg 
et al. 2012). For Wisconsin wolves, the corresponding estimate 
Table 1.—Estimating the relative risk of mortality as a proportion of marked animals, when marked animals disappear (unknown fates). A) 
Equal numbers of known and unknown fates, 1 perfectly documented cause of death (legal killing) and 1 inaccurately documented cause of death. 
B) The general expression for any n known fates and m unknown fates with 3 causes of death. Prior values are precise and accurate for n (number 
of known fates), m (number of unknown fates), Legal (number of marked animals killed legally), Observednon (number of marked animals of 
known fate that died from nonhuman causes), Observedoh (number of marked animals of known fate that died from human causes other than legal 
killing), and Expectednon + Expectedoh (the number of marked animals of unknown fate expected dead from nonhuman and other human causes, 
respectively) sum to m but have uncertain values. Unknown fates include recovered carcasses with unknown cause of death. P is the number of 
marked animals of unknown fate expected dead from cryptic poaching following equation 2.
Causes of death Mortality risk for marked animals
A) Known fates (50) Unknown fates (50) Known + unknown fates (100)
Perfectly documented legal killing 0.20 0a 0.10
Inaccurately documented causes 0.80 1.00 0.90
B) Known fates (n) Unknown fates (m) Known + unknown fates (n + m)
Legal killing Legal/n 0a Legal/(n + m)
Nonhuman causes Observednon/n Expectednon/m (Observednon + Expectednon)/(n + m)
Other human causes Observedoh/n (Expectedoh + P)/m (Observedoh + Expectedoh + P)/(n + m)
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was 46–54% of total poaching (Treves et al. 2017b), or for each 
observed poached wolf, 1 poached wolf eluded observation 
(Fig. 2B). In Supplementary Data SD1, we explain why the 
Wisconsin estimate is conservative. In brief, it treats poaching 
that was known as if there was no attempt at cryptic poaching. 
Estimates of cryptic poaching are probably landscape-specific 
and perhaps specific to certain years because they may reflect 
accessibility to habitat, human attitudes toward current policy, 
reporting animal deaths, etc. To isolate poaching from other 
human causes of death for Figs. 2B and 3, we accepted the offi-
cial estimates of known-fate poaching and vehicle collisions 
and applied their ratio to our estimates of other human causes 
in Table 1B (see Supplementary Data SD2 for the raw data). 
Then, we used 2 equations to estimate the numbers of marked 
animals of unknown fates expected to die from nonhuman causes 
and other human causes respectively, as follows: 
Expected m P Observed Observed Observednon non non oh= - · +   ( ) / ( ) (1a)
Expected m P Observed Observed Observedoh oh non oh= - · +   ( ) / ( ) (1b)
where n and m are defined above and in Table 1A, Legal is 
the number of marked animals killed legally, Observednon is the 
number of marked animals of known fate that died from non-
human causes, Observedoh is the number of marked animals of 
known fate that died from human causes other than legal kill-
ing, and P is defined by equation 2: 
  P Poached C  = o •  (2)
Fig. 2.—Systematic bias in estimating the risk of mortality when some marked animals have unknown fates (unobservable, question marks ?) and 
causes of death vary in the accuracy of documentation. Observed (silhouette with binoculars) known fates (check marks ✓) alone would underes-
timate the inaccurately documented causes of death (unknown fates, white, black, and blue squares). Two approaches to estimating unknown fates 
produce lower and upper bounds on estimates of risk of mortality, using equations 1a, 1b, and 2. A) The equal apportionment approach assumes that 
the observed ratio of known nonhuman causes of death (white squares with check marks) to known, other human causes of death (black squares with 
check marks) applies to the unknown fates (squares with approximately equal signs, ≈). B) The cryptic poaching approach with C = 2 from equation 2 
assumes that for every 1 known-fate poached animal (black square with check mark) there will be 2 unknown-fate poached animals (black square with 
≈), which must be accounted first before equal apportionment of the remainder adds 1 poached and 1 nonhuman cause of death (white square with ≈). 
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where Poachedo is the number of marked animals of known 
fate that died from poaching and C is the scalar of cryptic 
poaching, which we assigned the values of 0 (equal apportion-
ment), 1 (Wisconsin estimate), or 2 (Scandinavian estimate) as 
explained above.
results
Section 1: overestimating risk for perfectly documented 
causes of death.—Estimating relative risk of mortality from 
legal causes using only the known fates produced estimates 
that were 0.05–0.16 higher than when unknown fates were 
included (Table 2). Published estimates of the risk of legal kill-
ing also tend to be higher than ours in Table 2. For Wisconsin 
wolves, Stenglein et al. (2015) reported 0.125 risk for “Legal” 
(their Table 2), which was 0.063 higher than our estimate for 
the same period. For NRM wolves, Smith et al. (2010) reported 
0.30 risk of mortality from “legal causes,” which is 0.06 higher 
than our estimate of the risk of mortality from legal causes for 
the same period. Disparities were not so clear for Mexican and 
red wolves. Because the USFWS reported mortality risk for 
Mexican wolves after excluding most legal causes (USFWS 
2016c), their proportions are not directly comparable to ours. 
For red wolves, the USFWS and (Murray et al. 2015) estimated 
risk as we did (USFWS 2007) citing Murray unpublished. 
However, disparities between the 2 reports for red wolves could 
not be reconciled so we used the median which was 0.05 higher 
than our estimate in Table 2. The overestimates of legal killing 
in Table 2 increased from 0.05 to 0.16 as the risk of legal killing 
rose (Fig. 1B).
Section 2: underestimating risk for inaccurately documented 
causes of death.—Complementary to overestimates of legal 
killing, estimates of the relative risk of other human-caused 
mortality using known fates produced lower estimates than 
when unknown fates were included (Figs. 2A and 2B; Table 3). 
Official estimates of other human causes of mortality for 
Wisconsin wolves (Natural Resources Board 2012; Stenglein 
et al. 2015) were 0.17–0.36 lower than ours in Table 3. The offi-
cial estimates of risk of mortality from other human causes for 
NRM wolves from Murray et al. (2010) and Smith et al. (2010) 
Fig. 3.—Endangered wolves (gray: Canis lupus, Mexican gray: C. l. baileyi, and red: C. rufus) and risk of mortality from poaching as a proportion 
of all deaths. Approximate geographic locations are shown for 4 populations in the United States. The relative risks of mortality from poaching 
by government estimates (dark gray bars, no uncertainty estimates available) are paired with the same estimates from this study (light gray bars; 
error bars: lower bound derived from the equal apportionment approach and upper bound derived from the Scandinavian estimate of cryptic 
poaching C = 2). See Supplementary Data SD2 for poaching values separated from other human causes: Wisconsin (Natural Resources Board 
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were 0.14–0.27 lower than ours in Table 3. The official esti-
mate of risk of mortality from other human causes for Mexican 
wolves was 0.07–0.21 lower than ours in Table 3, when calcu-
lated with all deaths and permanent removals (USFWS 2016c). 
The median of the 2 estimates of risk of mortality from other 
human causes for red wolves was 0.26–0.40 lower than ours 
in Table 3. Even with the conservative equal apportionment 
approach, our ranges of estimates all fall above official point 
estimates made by agencies and biologists.
Poaching in particular has been underestimated systemati-
cally by biologists and policy makers (Fig. 3). In Fig. 3, we 
present the official estimates of poaching for 4 endangered wolf 
populations in the United States, compared to our range of esti-
mates from Table 3 and Supplementary Data SD2. Using the 
Wisconsin estimate of cryptic poaching (50%), our estimates 
of risk of mortality from poaching are 0.17–0.32 higher than 
official estimates of the risk of mortality from poaching. The 
Scandinavian estimate of cryptic poaching (66%) yielded esti-
mates of risk of mortality from poaching that are 0.32–0.45 
higher than official estimates of the risk of mortality from 
poaching. The Wisconsin estimate of cryptic poaching lies near, 
but slightly higher, than the median between the equal appor-
tionment lower bound (Fig. 2A) and the Scandinavian cryptic 
poaching upper bound (Fig. 2B), which suggests slightly asym-
metrical credible intervals because of negative skew.
Supplementary Data SD3 presents our estimates of risk of 
mortality for 3 causes of death (see Supplementary Data SD2). 
Poaching was the major cause of death for the 4 endangered 
wolf populations.
discussion
The relative risks of different causes of death for marked ani-
mals have often been miscalculated under 1 or both of the fol-
lowing common conditions: 1 or more causes of death were 
perfectly reported but others were not, or marked animals had 
unknown fates (i.e., disappeared without a trace or were recov-
ered but the cause of death was undetermined). The result-
ing bias overestimates the perfectly reported causes of death, 
such as legal killing, and underestimates the others, such as 
Table 2.—Relative risk of mortality from legal killing, as a proportion of all radiocollared wolves (Canis lupus or C. rufus) that had known 
fates or unknown fates (disappeared or unknown cause of death) for 4 wolf populations with n (number of known fates), m (number of unknown 
fates), and Legal (number of marked animals killed legally). NRM = Northern Rocky Mountains.
Populationa Known fates (n) Unknown fates (m)b Known + unknown fates (n + m)b
Wisconsin gray 0.12 0 0.06
NRM gray 0.40 0 0.24
Mexican gray 0.33 0 0.25
Red 0.13 0 0.08
aWisconsin 1979–2012 n = 221, m = 210, Legal = 27 (Treves et al. 2017b) from their Table 2; NRM 1982–2004 n = 320, m = 206, Legal = 128 (Murray et al. 
2010) from their Table 2; Mexican 1998–2015 n = 155, m = 53 (8 unknown, 6 awaiting necropsy, 39 lost signals), Legal = 51 (including permanent removals, and 
“Other causes of death include capture-related mortalities and legal shootings by the public”), from USFWS (2015); Siminski (2016); USFWS (2016a, 2016c, 
2016b, 2016d); North Carolina red wolves 1999–2007 n = 111, m = 55, Legal = 22 “management” (USFWS 2007) citing Murray, unpublished; however, Murray 
et al. (2015) reported n = 91, m = 58, Legal = 5. We report the median of the 2 red wolf values.
bBecause legal kills must be reported (known fates) or they are not legal, the corrected risk of legal killing followed the method in Table 1A and Fig. 1A.
Table 3.—Relative risk of mortality from inaccurately documented causes of death, as a proportion of all radiocollared wolves (Canis lupus 
or C. rufus) that had known fates or unknown fates (disappeared or unknown cause of death) for 4 wolf populations: n (number of known fates), 
m (number of unknown fates), Observedoh (number of marked animals of known fate that died from human causes other than legal killing), 
Expectedoh (the number of marked animals of unknown fate expected dead from other human causes), C is the cryptic poaching scalar of 0, 1, or 
2, and P is the number of marked animals of unknown fate expected dead from cryptic poaching following equation 2. NRM = Northern Rocky 
Mountains.
Populations and estimation approaches (C)a Observedoh/n (Expectedoh + P)/m Weighted average
Wisconsin equal apportionment (0) 0.57 0.65 0.60
Wisconsin cryptic poaching (1, 2) 0.57 0.80, 0.95 0.68, 0.75
NRM equal apportionment (0) 0.37 0.61 0.46
NRM cryptic poaching (1, 2) 0.37 0.77, 0.94 0.53, 0.59
Mexican equal apportionment (0) 0.52 0.77 0.59
Mexican cryptic poaching (1, 2) 0.52 1.05, 1.33d 0.66, 0.73
Red equal apportionment (0) 0.65 0.74 0.68
Red cryptic poaching (1, 2) 0.65 0.94, 1.13d 0.75, 0.82
aSources are identical to Table 2 and raw data are found in Supplementary Data SD2. We used the median of the 2 red wolf values: Poachedo = 45 (“Private Trap,” 
“Poison,” “Gunshot”b) or 39 (“Gunshot,” “illegal”c), Observedoh = 23 for both sources
b,c, comprising 0.76b or 0.72c of n − Legal = 90b or 86c, as the number of 
marked animals killed legally.
bUSFWS (2007).
cMurray et al. (2015).
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poaching. With evidence from 4 endangered wolf populations 
in the United States, we showed the miscalculation biased 
estimates substantially upwards for legal killing and biased 
them substantially downwards for other human causes (mainly 
poaching and vehicle collisions; Fig. 3 and Supplementary 
Data SD3). The error is non-random (systematic bias) and will 
increase under several common conditions: high rates of legal 
killing (Fig. 1B), high proportions of unknown fates (Fig. 2A), 
and high rates of cryptic poaching (i.e., unreported killing asso-
ciated with destruction of evidence; Fig. 2B).
The corrections we applied, under even the most conserva-
tive equal apportionment approach, yielded estimates indicating 
that unregulated human-caused mortality was the major cause 
of death in endangered wolf populations in the United States 
(Supplementary Data SD3). Observed poaching in all the popu-
lations we studied outnumbered the primary other human cause 
of death, vehicle collisions, by a factor of 2 or more. That means 
most of the underestimation of other human causes was due to 
underestimating poaching. When we corrected the bias, we found 
substantial underestimates of poaching (Fig. 3). Indeed, for every 
wolf population we examined, we found poaching was the greatest 
threat. In the NRM wolf populations from 1982 to 2004, poaching 
replaced legal killing as the major threat to wolves after correct-
ing for the mathematical miscalculation of legal killing. For the 
other wolf populations, the official reports had correctly identified 
poaching as the major threat, although they underestimated it.
There are several reasons our estimates of poaching are 
higher than previous ones. First, we demonstrated that prior 
estimates would have underestimated causes of death that are 
not perfectly documented. Second, we took 2 approaches to 
reconstruct the unknown fates of radiocollared wolves. The first 
approach, equal apportionment, assumes unmonitored wolves 
die of the same fates at the same rates as monitored wolves. 
This is unlikely to hold in any population of marked animals, 
let alone controversial ones such as wolves that are subject to 
high relative risks of legal and illegal killing. As such, the equal 
apportionment approach should be seen as a minimum bound 
on estimates of the risk of mortality from poaching. By con-
trast, we provided maximum bounds on the estimated risk of 
mortality from poaching, when we used the cryptic poaching 
approach, which apportions unknown fates to cryptic poach-
ing first, informed by prior estimates of cryptic poaching from 
the literature. We used 2 published values for cryptic poaching 
from the literature (50% and 66%) and found the higher one 
probably too high (Table 3 footnote d). Accordingly, we recom-
mend the 50% cryptic poaching estimate be used as the median 
for the likely range of values to estimate the risk of wolf mor-
tality from poaching. These values and approaches may need 
adjustment for other sites and other species.
The traditional assumption that the causes of death in indi-
viduals of known fate are representative of those of unknown 
fate is inaccurate whenever known fates include both perfectly 
documented and inaccurately documented causes of death. The 
bias increases in proportion to the number of legal kills and the 
number of unknown fates because each one adds additional bias 
(overrepresenting perfectly documented causes of death and 
underrepresenting inaccurately documented causes of death, 
respectively). By accounting fully for all marked animals and 
by estimating the unknown fates, we can extract more informa-
tion from the sample of marked animals than has been done 
traditionally. Extracting more information is desirable from the 
standpoint of management efficiency (less effort to mark ani-
mals is wasted when data are lost) and also for accuracy.
Some authorities will dismiss relative risk estimates as irrel-
evant for populations perceived to be large, growing, and resil-
ient. Such a dismissal might be biologically inappropriate. Three 
studies of gray wolves, 1 in Wisconsin and 2 separate popula-
tions in Alaska (Schmidt et al. 2015; Borg et al. 2016; Treves 
et al. 2017b), demonstrate that mortality rates (per capita haz-
ard) for marked wolves were as different as 15–28% from the 
per capita hazard rate for unmarked wolves. A mechanistic link 
between mismeasured risk and unrepresentative hazard rates 
for marked animals might exist. For example, it might relate 
to the methods used in recent years to mark wolves, such as 
livetrapping in areas where few people spend time or livetrap-
ping in core areas of established wolf pack territories, both of 
which may capture individuals with lower exposure to human-
caused mortality (Treves et al. 2017b). Alternatively, hunters 
and poachers may be able to target (or avoid) marked wolves 
with high accuracy, a possibility that has not been studied from 
the perspective of hunters and trappers, to our knowledge. If 
marked and unmarked animals experience differential per cap-
ita hazard rates, then marked animals will become less repre-
sentative of the population as the relative risk of human-caused 
mortality increases. Such a relationship could account for the 
empirical observations of accelerating declines in wolf popula-
tion growth as human-caused mortality increases (Adams et al. 
2008; Creel and Rotella 2010; Vucetich 2012).
Pending further study, we advise against extrapolation from 
data on haphazardly marked animals of any species. Moreover, 
one should not discard the lost data from marked animals of 
unknown fate as is common in wildlife mortality analyses 
(Liberg et al. 2012). We recommend governments and research-
ers report data on marked and unmarked animals transparently, 
including “time on the air” for telemetry data. Additionally, 
spatial variation in human density and activity across the range 
of marked animals might be useful when poaching is a major 
cause of death for study subjects. Together, such steps would 
improve estimates of mortality parameters for marked animals 
and, consequently, help to avert policy errors.
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Supplementary Data SD1.—Disappearances of marked 
animals.
Supplementary Data SD2.—Data for calculations in Tables 2 
and 3, and Supplementary Data SD3.
Supplementary Data SD3.—Revised estimates of risk for 
each category of cause of death in endangered wolf populations 
in the United States.
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